The NTSB report is worth a (first) read or a re-read.

https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR9605.pdf

It not only discusses the boiler failure; but also the human factors leading up to the incident. It provides a number of things to think about.

What the Gettysburg incident did was not increase regulatory oversight as much as reestablish the processes and procedures that the railroads used to keep their locomotives safe and sound.

The 1472 day rule is actually about what the railroads considered the lifespan of a firebox. In the age of operating relics, the collective knowledge of the steam professionals was lost. And operators, almost all amateurs, had no idea of what was required to safely maintain the worn out and on their last legs locomotives they inherited. Who knew that the firebox actually wore out? Part230 brought that back to ensure that only serious folks should be operating and maintaining steamers.

No serious accidents in 25 years is the result.

Over the years, I've never heard what happened to the crew.
The NTSB report speaks to the injuries suffered immediately after the venting out of the firebox and the burns suffered by the three in the cab.
But what about long-term? Are any of these men still working with steam or railroads at all?
I've heard every now and then that one died from his injuries but again, the NTSB report was vague on that from my memory of reading it.

This may be a dumb question, but it is directed towards the steam experts.

In the realm of operating steam locomotives, how does the 15 year rule relate to the 1472? I know that they are intertwined, which ever one comes first and it is time for a form 4. But for instance, is it unsafe to operate an engine that has say less than 300 operating days on it in 15 years?

I know there are many variables to play into it, but C&O 2716 comes to mind. I believe it was said it had around 30 operating days on its flues after being mothballed by Southern in mid-1982 with firebox cracks. It was re-flued by Bill Purdie in '81. It operated on those same flues, with a repaired firebox, for a weekend in Indiana for FWRHS and then the FRA required it to be re-flued. Help me understand the reasoning for that. I am in no way against it, because it keeps passengers, the crews, and the engines safe, i just want some clarification.

1472 service days is the approximate number of days a locomotive could run under the old regulations. If you ran it every day. Under the old rules a flue job lasted 48 months or 1440 days. If you ran at least one day per calendar month, you got 48 months then you either retubed the boiler or applied for a flue extension. If you had any out of service months, you could add those months to to the 48 months, but once you hit 60 months since you installed the tubes (whether you ran the engine or not), you either retubed the engine or asked for a flue extension.

A flue extension involved opening the smokebox, removing all the draft appliances and removing the bottom two tubes from the boiler. The FRA inspector would examine the removed tubes, look into the barrel of the boiler, looking for accumulated scale and other deterioration. If it looked good to him, he gave you a 12 month extension. You then put the tubes back in the boiler, re-installed the smokebox draft appliances, buttoned the whole thing up and ran it for another year. The next year you repeated the process until the inspector said you needed to reflue the boiler.

In the tourist RR industry the normal operating year runs about 6 months, so you could usually count on getting 4 extensions. If you had good water, you could get more. We had one engine on the C&TS that was flued in 1973 and it lasted until 1986 before the inspector told us "no more..."

The actual math is based on the inspection frequency.

While the number of days in a month vary the monthly inspection frequency is 31 days. This allows you to go one month ahead and inspect on the same date and always be in compliance.

Quarterly inspections have a 92 maximum frequency. Once again because some months have 31, 30, and in February 28 or 29. If you do the next inspection three months ahead on the same date you will always be in compliance.

Four quarters then becomes 368 and that times four years will give you the 1472 days.

Jim Cornell passed away in 2004. Based upon the obituary, it sounds unrelated to the burns he received during the accident.
https://legcy.co/2DfoumK

To simplify what others have already said, the new rule modified the time calculation by counting actual days of use instead of assuming numbers of days of use based on the number of calendar months operated. This allows the occasional steam locomotive operator (which all tourist railroad are) to extend the period between major inspections and component replacement, which financially benefits the operators without increasing risk to the public provided that the required inspections are performed correctly.

A locomotive that has been operated less than 300 days over 15 years could well be safe to operate, depending on the conditions in which it was stored, assuming no extraordinary events (such as the building catching on fire and the boiler getting some form of heat damage). Under normal circumstances, wear on the boiler only occurs with use. Of course, any steam locomotive that has been in long term storage should receive proper inspections prior to being put under steam.

Right. The fifteen year limit was a compromise reached when the rule was being written, when they concluded that there was no way to control how well a given boiler would be stored. They had to assume that it is being stored in the worst conditions, outdoors in the rain and high humidity with the stack uncovered, plugs in, and some water in the boiler. An engine stored under cover in the desert with the plugs out and the fire sides cleaned might be good for 100 years, but there is no way to write a rule to encompass all of the possibilities.

It's still three times better than what we had before.

Sounds like you are describing the "Eureka." Dan did get an extension; but, in time had to do the 1472 day inspection.

True. I was at TVRM when that happened. It was a worthy effort to get some positive change that would benefit operators without putting anyone at risk. For operators who only run steam occasionally and store their locomotives properly, it keeps running their locomotive affordable. The costs associated with the work necessary to perform inspections under the old rule were something that GM Ray and his group were attempting to address with the changes that they proposed.

Back to the question regarding if this incident and subsequent revised Part 230 has improved the safety culture in the industry regarding steam locomotives. Initially, and in the following years with the folks that were in the industry at the time, I would say it did.

With that said, and based on my experience and multiple recent events and other leading indicators, I am afraid that the lessons learned at Gettysburg have been lost to some of the current generation working with steam. In my travels with my job and consulting with others in the industry, I see that proper training, inspection and maintenance practices are no longer a priority. We could be falling back into that culture where all these requirements are just a paperwork exercise and there may no longer be an understanding regarding the intent of the regulation and associated best practices.

I hope I am wrong....

MD Ramsey

I agree 100%. There has been an increasing tempo of incidents, poor workmanship, and poor practices, especially among the younger crowd that it gives me pause, and I fear that if people don't change their ways and take this stuff seriously, a major incident may be just around the corner.

Without identifying specific organizations, would you say that the problems you observe fall mostly within organizations that only occasionally operate steam locomotives or it is more widespread?

One thing that the old hands at TVRM saw that my generation learned was the proper operation of the water sight glasses, injectors and low water alarms and I wasn't even an engineman by trade. Their attitude was that anyone who was going to spend any amount of time on or around the locomotives needed to know how to use those items and what to do if one of them failed.

One day, we got on the subject of the low water alarm and Paul Brock (the RFE) learned that none of us knew that the 4501 had a low water alarm, much less ever heard it go off. The next time we had 4501 under steam, Paul marched us young guys out to the locomotive, described its operation and made certain we heard it go off.

I am seeing maintenance and training concerns with organization that have frequent operations, but I can imagine the smaller ones have problems as well.

MD Ramsey