I don't think that an automatic control for an injector could be developed - I've had occasional fights with injectors over the years, usually on the winning side. As others have said it's all down to experience (and a little luck)
- god only knows what an "automatic" injector control would do when an exhaust steam injector does the transition to live steam!

I've always understood that a fusible plug is there to protect the boiler not the crew and I don't ever want to be in the cab when a jet of high pressure steam hits the fire!

Having read all the post {at this time} I have to agree with most. There are many of these authers have been there or are still there. They have the hands on knowledge that I respect.

I am amongst many things a High Power rifle competitor, so my interest in firearms laws and safety is important. My sport as most firearms sports/hunting are constantly being threatened by criminals and people who don't know what they are doing safety wise. The nimbies would like to make guns fool proof, it will never happen. Killing someone by accident is my biggest fear, and it should be all of ours {worst fears}. By being safety concious and responseable is the key to making it not happen. I am also a nursing student and now give injections and medications. You wouldn't believe the dangers in this activity. The possibilities for med errors are endless. The med world is trying desperately to make med pass fool proof. None of these other examples are fool proof and will never be. Common sense, good work ethics and training help. You just can't fix stupid. Accidents happen to the best of us, me included {sometimes my best isn't that good} but there comes a time when you just have to be accountable and I think running steam of any kind puts you in that catagory.

I grew up around Mid Continent as a adolescent kid and remember the old engineers who came from a steam background. These guys were pros. But we had one who I liked a lot, but he was one that didn't believe he had to lube anything. He just wanted to run the engine. There were newer engineers who lacked the knowledge of the importance of lubing things. This is a stray from fool proofing boilers, but I am trying to give examples of crew members who acted irresponsably and while not endangering anybody to badly, still caused needless mechanical failures. You just can't fix stupid. I wish all engineers would want to come in the shop and have to work on boilers and running gears to see how much fun it to have to fix careless operator errors.

I tend to agree that a well trained crew is the answer. There is about zero tolerance for the most trivial, less than appropriate behavior in nursing, to the point of being stupid. But yet I have seen or heard of such egotistical behavior on train crews that it surprises me that these things don't happen more often. Putting a big cigar in your mouth, talking impotent and stroking each other doesn't make you a pro. Most of the professional RR men I have know act like professionals, at least while operating. Off duty is a subject we won't go too.

This is good material folks, redundent maybe, but we need to be responseable, all of us, not just the other guys. Of course I am speaking most of all to me. Cheers, John.

I think we already have reduncancy when it comes to monitoring water level. Do not most locomotives require two water glasses, and do not most have tri cocks? And now the requirement for a tender water glass - since if there is no water in the tender it is problematic for an injector to add it to the boiler? And there are usually two injectors in case one is balky and fails to lift or take suction. There are many backups when it comes to maintaining water in the boiler - and does anyone suspect the reason for this??

How many levels of redunancy and alarms are required?? IMHO it is a training and people issue. True, railroad boilers were operated for decades and decades by properly trained crews. But how many books have pics of specataular incidents of boiler failure, nevertheless. In many cases the crew did not survive to testify as to events leading to the failure.

Bob Kutella

Bob,

You're on the money.

FRA rules (230.5?) dictate that steam locomotives must have two sight glasses and must be blown down and tested throughout the day to insure proper readings and to combat scale buildup. Many steam operators have removed the gauge cocks for another water column. Gauge cocks, however, are a good way to double check readings in the water glass.

Kelly Lynch

I like having the water glasses and the gage cocks. I have had water glasses scale up in the matter of a few miles with some very bad water and a locomotive in need of a boiler wash.......but never a gage cock.....

Kelly,

The rules in the UK require two methods of checking water level, two methods of putting water in the boiler and two safety valves i.e. there must be redundancy in the system. The two methods of checking the water level are usually two glasses but there are plenty of boilers fitted with one glass and test cocks (which I loathe) and the two methods of putting water into the boiler are almost invariably injectors.

G

Although at first look there appears to be an inherent contradiction, in fact there is not. Comparing automatic train stop systems to low water alarms is an 'apples to oranges' comparison.

Automatic train stop systems respond to a an absolute condition, the indication of a signal giving a 'STOP'. Water level in a boiler of a working locomotive is not a static condition and, therefore, not absolute.

Setting a Barco or other low water alarm to trip at half a glass of water as suggested later in this thread could result in the alarm being tripped by normal fluctuations in water level due to track gradient even though the water is actually at a perfectly acceptable and safe level.

In my humble view, knowledge that failure to maintain safe water level will result in catastrophic consequences, coupled with pride in your craft at carrying on the tradtions of safe, efficient operation of steam locomotives should be enough of a low water alarm.

You can’t really compare automatic train stop with automatic explosion prevention. With automatic train stop you only have to accomplish one thing – stop the train, which is relatively easy to do from a mechanical standpoint. This is also accomplished in an environment that is cleaner and more predictable and within a mechanical culture that has been well developed at phenomenal expense over the years. Even then, though the system is fail-safe, it would be a stretch to say that it is foolproof.

It would be my guess knowing what I do about regulatory agencies and requirements that the cost of implementing an explosion prevention system would be well beyond the means of any steam operator in the country. I am sure, given the talented people in our industry, that we could come up with something that would be reasonably reliable most of the time but that isn’t going to fly in today’s world. Besides, the system we have now is reasonably reliable most of the time. What would be the point?

Proper training industry wide would improve safety at a relatively small cost. Developing an automatic system to the reliability level of current automatic train stop systems would improve safety as well, but we can’t afford it. It almost seems to me that you get to go out of business either by blowing up a boiler or because you can’t afford to equip the locomotives with the system.

Somewhere practicality has to enter into this. We don’t have the luxury that the government has in the post-911 world to spend gobs of money on an impractical, marginally effective system just so we can get that warm and fuzzy feeling of perceived security. Practical application of an automatic explosion prevention system presents huge mechanical challenges that are not insurmountable, but at what cost? Add to that the bureaucratic and jurisdictional requirements that necessarily will be part of the equation and practicality for our industry seems highly questionable.

This discussion is pretty much winding down. The only remaining piece to add is a link to current boiler monitoring technology. This is just a quick search result. I don't know all the range of technology available.

http://www.levelstate.com/technical.htm

Decades ago, water level monitoring meant a mechanical float working a switch. Modern systems have various options that do not require any moving parts. The vendor above has at least two systems. One is based on a probe that senses the difference in electrical conductivity between steam and water. The other uses an optical sensor in a gauge glass.

It's not a matter of if boiler monitoring will be added to steam locomotives, it is a matter of when. Next year, next decade? Years ago a digital caliper was an expensive extravagence. Today they are cheaper, and maybe more accurate, than their Swiss watch cousins. We should review the cost and performance of these systems periodically. At some point in the future their cost will be so low that failing to install them could be an automatic verdict of guilt and negligence.

I guess I can be considered a dinosaur, but I don’t think there’s a need to “High Tech” ourselves out of business over something that training people thoroughly and maintaining the present monitoring systems that will perform the same duty.

In house training should be the first step to anything pertaining to your equipment. The proper manuals, be they ICS or railroad generated manuals is a start. If there is a need, call in a qualified person to augment the manuals. They’re out there and would be glad to help.

Just as in military training, repetition works. When I fired, I developed a routine where I scanned the track ahead, checked the water glass, checked the boiler pressure, checked the color of the oil fire and checked the smoke. Communication with the engineer (and pilot engineer if on a mainline to be forewarned of hills, etc) is important on an oil burner, as you need to work in unison. If you are on your own captive railroad, then you know where the engineer will be working, shutting off and where the grades top out so you can fire and watch your water and react proactively.

When I was engineer, I had a slightly different routine. Watch track ahead and signals, sweep the water glass, steam gauge, duplex air gauge and listen to the engine. None of this is rocket surgery, just developing safe work habits. Again, since all of my running was on mainline railroads I enjoyed having a pilot engineer to talk to me about where the hills, etc, were when we had one. I guess you could keep track charts in the cab and monitor them, but they distract from the job at hand.

Blowing down the water column and glasses should never be neglected! Our locomotive had suspenders and a belt. Two water glasses and tri-cocks and all were tested and tested. I cannot overemphasize doing this, checking the firebox and fire periodically and blowing down not only the boiler, but also the glasses to keep them clean.

Good common sense, vigilance and training works every time

OK, I'll bite on this one again.

The engineer and fireman provide two sets of two each optical sensors (in most cases) which can very quickly review either or both water gauge glasses, and not only register a report, but begin a series of complex executive actions in an appropriate response to that stimulus. Thus, optical boiler monitoring has always been on steam locomotives since water glasses were first used. All replacing a person with an electronic component will do is reduce drastically the level of possible points of test, outcomes, and even more the level of reliability and robustness. It will be far less safe than people with adequate training.

Lex, if you have personally verified that the sensors you refer to here have been tested over many years in the intensive, destructive environment that is an operating steam locomotive and haven't failed more often than people have, I'd surely be very willing to reconsider should you provide that documentation. My experience with lightweight, delicate electronic devices is in opposition to that. They seem to require a cleaner environment with many fewer mechanical shocks and a much tighter range of fluctuations over a much narrower range of tolerances than that which reflects the reality of operating steam.

I would suggest that willfully applying any instrument to a machine that is incapable of providing the service for which it is used is much more negligent than leaving the better, proven, more reliable system alone - but then, I am not a lawyer.

dave

All I have left to say on this tiresome subject is this observation: it seems to me that NONE of the advocates of electronic monitoring of locomotive boilers have the experience nor standing to comment with any real insight on the subject.

The leaders of steam preservation and operation are all in 100% agreement...gadgetry will not improve safety, and if a qualified competant crew isn't available, create one, find one, or quit.

I make my living as a boiler inspector. I see automatic controls every day and there is not a one I would trust in locomotive service, and there is no way to modify them to do so. Even with automatic controls, the most important factor in boiler safety is the human in charge.

A machine cannot anticipate steam usage, a machine cannot know that it needs to get the water on at milepost 57 because by milepost 61 the engine is gonna be working hard and you don't want to knock pressure in the head by kicking on the gun...a machine cannot adapt to the road and figure out when and where it may be best to keep only one nut of water instead of half a glass. All the gadgets will be is another problem to maintain.

Again I say that anyone who wants to turn the responsiblity of boiler management (for that is what we are really talking about) over to a spark box should just stick to the offspring of LaGrange.

Thank you Mr.Templin for a very well put summary! 'Nuff said!!!!
Ross Rowland