As to the later EL Wreck:

Despite the interesting pictures, there's just not enough information for an amateur such as myself to pinpoint the location. I would however LOVE to have that EL bulldozer!

As for the earlier DL&W wreck:

My comment was not intended to imply anyone was taking issue rules & regulations in this post, nor to imply whether or not any one particular regulation could have prevented the accident. Rather this could be very well something to refer back to when others complain about federal intrusion into our industry.

Some of today's regulatory issues that could be pertinent to this incident: Hours of Service, consumption of intoxicants, passenger car design, locomotive design, method of traffic control, just to name a few.

My point is that rules and regs, even though they my appear over-reaching at times, exist for a reason.

Rather this could be very well something to refer back to when others complain about federal intrusion into our industry.

Some of today's regulatory issues that could be pertinent to this incident: Hours of Service, consumption of intoxicants, passenger car design, locomotive design, method of traffic control, just to name a few.


I still don't know how this accident endorses federal regulation then (the accident occurred) or now (your "could be pertinents" are speculative and not supported as potentially averting this accident by the facts as presented). There's simply nothing here to suggest that the accident occurred due to a lack of rules or regulation or because of "self-policing".

The reference or sticky I get from this is that safety is principally the result of remaining alert, aware and oriented to the task at hand, mindful of the danger and operating in respect of that grave danger.

With this DL&W collision, the obvious cause was the engineer passing block signals without seeing them. A second cause was the failure of the flagman to use torpedoes. However, the railroad had a rule that prohibited the use of torpedoes during weather of normal visibility. I wonder what the purpose of that prohibition was. Were they trying to save money by not wasting torpedoes?

In any case, the flagman was left to decide whether using torpedoes would be necessary, not necessary, or illegal. Figuring the weather was not restricting visibility, the flagman chose “not necessary.” Unfortunately, however, the engineer was visually distracted at the moment of passing the flagman. From this mishap, the DL&W probably learned that it does not do any good to have good weather visibility if an engineer is not paying attention to the view. If a person is distracted from the application of sight, a torpedo will get his attention audibly.

What I find interesting about these accounts of early wrecks is the very up-close description of the operational details that otherwise would be mostly lost history. The wrecks and their descriptions in investigations and newspaper coverage are like a magnifying glass to view earlier operating practice.

Also striking is just how wild, bold, and dramatic railroading was in its “teenage” years circa 1880-1910.