Oh, sorry, I didn't intend to question your comments personally. I just find it facinating that we, as a society, preserve some things and not others. And, while I would not pay much to see someone calculating mortgages by longhand, I would like to see more things railroad preserved and to that end have put a portion of my earnings (none of which was derived calculating mortgages).

Semper Vaporo,
Charles T. McCullough

Besides the books mentioned far below, I recommend "From Steam to Diesel: Managerial Customs and Organizational Capabilities in the Twentiety Century American Locomotive Industry" by Albert J. Churella, published 1998 by Princeton University Press. It may be college-text priced at $55.00, but it's THE best overall examination of the economics of the conversion from steam to diesel, with the perfect cross of railfan-style lingo and economics blather. In addition, it examines why EMD succeeded so mightily whereas Baldwin, Lima, and Alco faltered and eventually folded, and why and how the other players--Fairbanks-Morse, GE--had their problems.

lner4472@bcpl.net

> Second, (and this ties in with Marty's
> comments) we are fortunate to have highly
> motivated and highly educated firemen at the
> Valley. At that time our weekday firemen
> (Chris Locke and Chris Adams) took get pains
> (and pride) in getting the most out of a
> scoop of coal, and one of them was on the
> locomotive a majority of the time.

I had the pleasure of riding behind 1647 on the Valley twice during her brief service there. I can personally attest that the 90% of the time the stack exhaust was so clear it was nearly invisible--you could clearly see the steam jet from the blast pipe coming up right out of the middle of the stack, clear as day, something I've never seen on any other engine. Most efficient firing I've EVER seen.

eledbetter@rypn.org

I laugh at the claim that railroads had to replace steam facilities with diesel faciltiies. In most cases, they simply adapted exiting steam facilties to diesel repairs and maintenance. To this day, there are a number of large shops that were built for steam locomotives thaty still serve to maintain diesels. Examples? CSX's Huntington, WV shop, UP's Ft. Worth, TX shop, and I'm sure there are others. Rebuilders VMV, NRE and LRC seem to be doing well with old steam shops, too.

It took a while, but railroads soon figured out they didn't need nearly as many roundhouses and shops with diesels. It wasn't necessary to have a roundhouse and machine shop every 100 miles, no more than it was necessary to have a water tank (and pump station) every 20 miles or a coal chute every 75 miles.

The reality is that it didn't take railroads long to figure out that diesels could get running repairs in the roundhouse just like the steam engines. The same drop tables that handled drivers from 4-8-4's changed traction motors and wheelsets; the same cranes that lifted boilers off running gear could change trucks or lift out the prime mover, and the same pits used for cellar packing and adjusting shoes and wedges were used for traction motor gearcase and support bearing lubes. Some railroads didn't get around to building purpose-designed diesel shops until the late 1960's or early 1970's, long after dieselization.

As to numbers, I looked at some annual reports and made comparisons. The following is for Jim Adams's railroad, the IC.

In 1951, IC had 1,230 locomotives (164 diesels and 1,066 steamers.) With these locomotives, they hauled 78,107,208 tons of revenue freight and 6,960,336 tons of company material (non-revenue).

They spent $17,016,814 on locomotive repairs, fuel, water, and lubricants. They spent $1,786,519 maintaining and repairing fuel and water stations and shop facilities. The railroad had 38,287 employees, the operating ratio was 75.69, and they had total debt of $205,593,220.

In 1961, IC had just 627 locomotives, 47% fewer. With these locomtives, the hauled 65,187,081 revenue tons (a decline) of 16.6% and 2,597,484 tons of company material (non revenue). The 66% decline in company material hauled (which is a good thing) is mostly steam locomotive coal and cinders.

In 1961, they spent $22,640,461 on locomotive repairs, fuel, water, and lubricants, roughly a 47% reduction. They spent $587,656 maintaining and repairing fuel and water station and shop faciltiies (a 67% reduction). The railroad had 22,592 employees, the operating ratio was 79.12, and they had total debt of $197,573,000, 4% lower than 1951, which completely refutes the argument that railroads took on huge debt to dieselize and that said debt led to the bankruptcies of the 1970's.

None of the above has been adjusted for inflation; it would take a statistician to do that. I suspect that once adjustements were made, the figures would be even more favorable to diesels.

One intersting stat: In 1951, IC's average revenue per ton was $3.11, and it's average revenue per ton-mile was 1.197 cents. 10 years later, the figures were $3.12 and 1.2 cents. Hardly any change in 10 years; adjusted for inflation, of course, these numbers would show a drop in real revenue. Adn they are another reason why the railroads desperately needed the huge savings diesels brought.

With number like this, the 1% or 1.5% improvements in productivity that fancicer, exotic and largely untested steam designs promised were no match for the 45% and 50% improvements that the diesels actually delivered.

The question becomes how many railroads were SAVED from bankruptcy by dieselization, and ow many that would have eventully gone bankrupt no matter what were able to delay that reckoning, in some cases for several decades.

Bad rich man comparison.The IC was probably the money makingest RR in the '50s. They were doing so well that they had to find something to put their excess cash in. Ever heard of the Midas Muffler chain?

I will still argue that several RRs found themselves in a financial bind because of HASTY dieselization. Case in point. MKT was 100% steam free by 1952. They bought anything and everything to retire a well maintained yet older fleet of steamers. Because of the debt, they were in serious trouble by the mid 50's, and they had a whole fleet of engines that needed rebuilding.
It was only the fact that John Barringer was a miricle worker that the MKT wasn't the Rock Island closure part I.

I think an arguement could be made that a more rational dieselization program that went in stages may have allowed many of the companies in the Northeast to have remained independant much longer than they did.

Dieselization was inevitable. But IT COULD have been too much, too fast for some roads.

lorija799@aol.com

> Bad rich man comparison.The IC was probably
> the money makingest RR in the '50s. They
> were doing so well that they had to find
> something to put their excess cash in. Ever
> heard of the Midas Muffler chain?

I certainly have, and it has nothing to do with IC in the 1950's. IC Industries was not even formed until 1963, and it didn't acquire Midas (and other companies) until 1970. And IC was not even close to being the money-makingest railroad in the 1950's. Spend some time checking old Moody's, old ICC financial reports, and old annual reports for the individual railroads. IC was a solid railroad, but it was no financial powerhouse.

> I will still argue that several RRs found
> themselves in a financial bind because of
> HASTY dieselization. Case in point. MKT was
> 100% steam free by 1952. They bought
> anything and everything to retire a well
> maintained yet older fleet of steamers.
> Because of the debt, they were in serious
> trouble by the mid 50's, and they had a
> whole fleet of engines that needed
> rebuilding.

How much debt did MKT have before they began dieselization? Katy, as was the case with so many midwestern roads, always was marginal, and went through bankruptcy at least once. I agree that MKT bought too many models of diesels form too many builders, and that much of what they bought turned out to be junk.

> It was only the fact that John Barringer was
> a miricle worker that the MKT wasn't the
> Rock Island closure part I.

Barriger didn't come to the Katy until the late 1960's; by then MKT's traffic levels were half what they had been just after WWII, and that was a far larger factor in MKT's financial troubles than was dieselization.

> I think an arguement could be made that a
> more rational dieselization program that
> went in stages may have allowed many of the
> companies in the Northeast to have remained
> independant much longer than they did.

You've got it backward. Had they stuck with steam, the bankruptcies would have come much sooner than they did. The big problems in the NE were passegner and commutter losses as well as too much plant and too many peopole and outrageous property taxes. Dieselization bought time for these roads, as they usually paid for the diesels out of the huge savings from getting rid of steam and all of it's supporting network.
The only NE road to default on an equipment trust was the O&W. The others paid them off in 15 years from purchase, which means that all debt from buying diesels was paid off 15 years after the diesels were first bought. Thus, a railroad that dieselized in, say, 1955, had fully paid off it's locomotive debt by 1970.

Also, equipment obligations, which also include freight cars and, in this case, passenger cars, were just part of any railroad's debt load.

> Dieselization was inevitable. But IT COULD
> have been too much, too fast for some roads.

I will agree that some went so fast that they made some poor decisions in terms of what to buy, how many to buy, what shops to convert, and what mainteance schedule to adopt. In this respect, they sometimes bought too many models from too many builders; Katy wasn't the only one who feel intot hat trap. They bought too many specialized units because they didn't understand the flexibility of diesels, and thought they had to be purpose-built, as steam locos were. Until they understood the actual maintenance needs of diesels, they tended to waste a lot of money overmaintaining them in too many shops, trying to make the diesels fit into the same shopping intervals and routines as steam power, when in fact the diesels need far less regular maintenance and went several times farther between overhauls than did any steam engine.

But I will not agree that dieselization in and of itself brought any raiload to it's knees financially. Quite the opposite, in fact. Roads like the O&W were already dead before they bought their first diesel.