The Brockton Boiler Explosion

M Austin · **Joined:** Sat Feb 05, 2005 1:05 am **Posts:** 488

The Brockton Boiler Explosion.
From The Locomotive, Hartford Steam Boiler Insurance Co., April 1905

At a few minutes before eight o'clock, on the morning of March 20, 1905, a terrible boiler explosion occurred at Brockton, Mass., in the factory of R. B. Grover & Company, manufacturers of the Emerson shoe. The explosion and its effects were awful, beyond all description. The entire country was profoundly shocked, and Brockton itself was overwhelmed with horror and grief.

On Monday morning, March 20, without the slightest warning, boiler No. 2 exploded with extreme violence, destroying the boiler house, and also blowing down, instantly, the entire Denton Street wing of the main building, and a considerable part of the Calmar Street section. Fire broke out within a few minutes of the explosion, it being caused, in our opinion, the open gas jets which were necessarily used in the process of shoe manufacturing. The ruins burned fiercely, partly because the wood work was very dry, partly because of the escape of the gas, and of the naphtha that was used in the manufacturing processes, and partly (we are informed) because the floors were more or less saturated with oily matters. We do not desire to give the impression that the factory was regarded as a poor fire risk, however, for we understand that it was insured by the fire companies at a rather low rate, indicating that they did not anticipate any very serious fire. The building was also furnished with automatic sprinkling apparatus, but this, of course, was rendered useless by the breaking of the pipes, when the building fell. The entire building was quickly destroyed by the flames, including the "new building," which remained standing, as well as the part that was thrown down by the explosion.

At time of the explosion there were about 400 persons working in the factory, 200 of whom were in the part of the building which collapsed. Many of the 200 who were thrown down with the ruins were imprisoned by the wreckage, and were killed by the flames, before they could be extricated by the rescuing party. The scenes at the ruins were heartrending, and beggar description. Let us pass them over reverently. We should like to record the fact, however, that there were many notable exhibitions of heroism, both on the part of the dying and of the rescue party. It is not on the Battlefield alone that heroism is seen. The flames were roaring fiercely, and the time that the work of rescue could be continued was all too short. Numbers of those who were badly hurt begged the rescuers to pass them by, and save others. Many who could not be reached cried out messages of love and remembrance for their friends that would shortly know them no more. Concerning the deeds of the rescue party, we desire particularly to mention those of the Rev. Father J. M. Keleher, pastor of St. Margaret's Church, and of his curate, Rev. Father James O'Rourke. The former risked his life repeatedly in aiding in the rescue, while many of his parishioners were burned to death before him. Father O'Rourke was among the first at the scene. He rescued seven persons, and continued at work until he was overcome by the smoke and the exertion, and was physically unable to do more. Of the 200 persons in the collapsed part of the building, no less than 58 died, either in the ruins or after being removed, and 117 others were injured. Most of the bodies in the ruins were burned beyond recognition, and identification had to be effected, in many cases, by the aid of buttons or trinkets, after the fire had been controlled. Even by these means it was found to be impossible to identify more than 17 or 18 of the bodies, and the remainder were buried by the city of Brockton, public burial services being held on the day of the funeral at five different places simultaneously, including the churches and the City Theater.

The exploded boiler was of the horizontal tubular type, was built in 1891 by E. Kendall & Sons of Cambridgeport, Mass., and had been inspected and insured during this entire period. It was first inspected in the boiler-maker’s shop on October 10, 1891, when it was thoroughly examined in every respect, and was also subjected to a hydrostatic test of 150 pounds to the square inch. It was 72in. in diameter and 17 feet long, and was built of four courses of plates, the plates being 3/8 in. thick, one plate to a course. The heads were ½ in. thick, and there were 140 three-inch tubes. The seams were double-riveted lap seams. (We shall return to this point subsequently.) The boiler gave way at the longitudinal riveted seam on the rear course of plates, this course and the rear head being torn from the rest of the shell, the rear sheet being found near its original position, while the head was carried forward for a distance of 42 feet. The remaining portion of the boiler, consisting of the three forward courses of plates, the front head, and the tubes, was projected in a direction nearly parallel to Denton Street, to a distance of 211 feet.

The last internal inspection of the boiler was made on December 28, 1904, at which time no defects were found; and the inspector, after a thorough examination, pronounced the boiler perfectly safe for continued service. So far as the records show (and all the testimony given by employed of the Grover Company corroborate these records) the boiler was not in service at any time since that last inspection, until it was fired up on Sunday, March 19, the day before the explosion; the larger boiler (No. 1) being then put out of service. The inspector having reported, on December 28th, that the boiler was in good condition and free from defects, why did it explode practically as soon as it was fired up again? In cases of this sort we generally hear a great deal said about low water, and the carelessness of the engineer. In the present instance there was but little talk of this nature. There is no evidence that the engineer was negligent in any respect, and there is, on the contrary, plenty of evidence that there was a proper quantity of water in the boiler. The condition of the fusible plug alone would be sufficient evidence on this point. The Massachusetts law requires that every boiler shall be provided with a fusible plug, filled with tin or some other substance melting at a low temperature; this plug being so situated that it will be covered with water (and therefore prevented from melting) so long as the water in the boiler is at a safe level, but will be uncovered (and therefore exposed to the heat of the furnace without protection) when the water level falls to a dangerous point. In case the water in the boiler becomes dangerously low, the fusible plug is supposed to melt and permit the steam in the boiler to escape; the pressure being thereby reduced, and the engineer’s attention directed to the fact that the boiler has too little water. This boiler was provided with such a plug, and after the explosion the plug was found to be in good condition, and unmelted.

The real cause of the explosion appears to have been a defect that is technically known as a “lap-joint crack” in the outer sheet, where that lapped over the inner one, in the rear course of the boiler. “Lap-joint cracks” are well-known sources of danger in boilers, and they are diligently sought for by inspectors. They may occur in either the inner or outer lap of the joint, and they invariably start from the interior surface, where the two plates are in contact, then extending into and through the plate, until its strength is practically destroyed. When a crack of this character has developed to such an extent that the plate is actually perforated at some point, it is possible for the inspector to detect the defect. It is common, however, for such a crack to penetrate the plate quite deeply and uniformly, for a considerable distance along the joint, before actual perforation takes place at any point. Detection is then a matter of the greatest difficulty, and (as we confidently believe was the case in the present instance) it may even be actually impossible. We have no positive evidence that the crack in the Brockton boiler existed at the time our inspector made his last visit; but even if it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that it did exist at that time, unless there was an actual perforation of the plate the crack could not be seen either from the inside of the boiler or from the outside; and unless the crack had actually perforated the plate at some point, or had ran into a rivet hole somewhere, its presence could not have been betrayed by even the slightest leakage. If there were any known way of detecting these hidden cracks, insurance inspectors and state inspectors alike would hail its discovery with joy.

The inquest, which was called by District Attorney Asa P. French, technically for the purpose of determining how Richard Sprigings, one of the identified victims, came to his death, but really in order to investigate the cause of the explosion and find out who was to blame for it, was held at Brockton, on March 29th, Judge F. M. Bixby presiding. Fifteen witnesses were examined in all. Three of them, comprising the medical examiner, the city marshal, and an employee in the fated factory, testified as to the death of Richard Sprigings. Three other witnesses told about the exploded boiler. In this group was the man who made the boiler, the man who bought it, and the man who last inspected it. Then came five boiler experts, including two state inspectors of steam boilers and three inspectors of boiler insurance companies, who told of the characteristics of the type of boiler which exploded—i.e., the lap-seam boiler. They corroborated one another in all essential points, chief of which was the liability of the development of the ”lap-joint crack,” and the impossibility of discovering it by any known test. The last four witnesses testified as to the condition of the engineer on the morning of the explosion, and as to the amount of steam pressure in the boiler as shown by the gauge a few minutes before the explosion. At the conclusion of the inquest, District Attorney French made the following statement: “No evidence has been presented to me to show the criminal responsibility of any person for this explosion, which caused such a large loss of life, and in which the public is so deeply interested. The explosion was due to a danger peculiar to this class of boilers, a danger in the structural form of the boiler, almost impossible of detection, and therefore a defect all the more dangerous because so subtle. To paraphrase an old saying, I would say that the person morally responsible for this explosion and the loss of life is the man who devised this particular type of boiler.” (That is, the lap-joint boiler.)

Stan Ottaway · **Joined:** Fri Jan 08, 2010 4:39 pm **Posts:** 55

I have seen these photos and heard excerpts of the story during the opening remarks of ASME courses. Thank you for sharing the whole story.

S.O.

Stationary Steam · **Posted:** Thu Apr 15, 2010 8:25 pm

Its hard to fathom the idea of a boiler crashing through your front door. The equivalent of a jet engine falling from the sky and landing in your easy chair!

M Austin · **Joined:** Sat Feb 05, 2005 1:05 am **Posts:** 488

mentioning landing in your easy chair...

Dave · **Posted:** Thu Apr 15, 2010 10:06 pm

So how can we perform inspections to detect hidden cracks between the laps using today's technology and how often must we do so to assure safety and reliability?

dave

Robby Peartree · **Joined:** Wed Aug 25, 2004 11:16 am **Posts:** 767

The pictures reminded me of SKY LAB, soon to hit your neighborhood. And yes I did have the T shirt.

Robby Peartree

jim templin · **Posted:** Thu Apr 15, 2010 11:01 pm

Let the sky is falling lap seam boiler hysteria begin, and lets trot out the same old crap about the Brockton boiler explosion.
First; this was an old and very well used boiler, that was in its second or third installation.
Second; this was a cheap built boiler for the most price sensitive sector of the boiler market, mill boilers, which invariably used the most inexpensive source of steam available, the externally fired HRT. Basically a shell with tubes in in set in brickwork. The externally fired design also sets up a situation where the shell is subjected to wild differences temperature over the surface of the shell. This also contributes to thermal stresses not present in an internally fired boiler, especially since these boilers were invariably of large (over 42") diameter.
Third; This boiler was built in the era of punched rivit holes...it is this work hardening from the the punching that causes the chain cracking that runs between rivit holes. If a butt strap boiler has punched holes that do not have the work hardened material removed, it will do the same thing. Plain punching without reaming, drilling ect. was eliminated as a common practice at least by the 1890's.
MANY YEARS OF DILIGENT REASEARCH BY MANY LEARNED RESEARCHERS HAS YET TO FIND A RECORD OF AN INTERNALLY FIRED SMALL DIAMETER BOILER FAILURE DUE TO A LAP SEAM CRACK.We have found examples of the classic firebox failure (no explaination needed), and also shell failures. The shell failures were invariably due to corrosion, grooving, or other deterioration that should have been evident by diligent inspection. In this months issue of [i]Iron Age[i] magazine their is a reprint of an old newspaper article of a Peerless traction engine failure in the '30s. While the reporter states it was due to the introduction of cold water into a red hot boiler, the picture shows the engine standing straight up, exposing the undamaged crown sheet, but the barrell exploded. The article then states that their was extensive deterioration and corrosion at the barrell and the belly. The seam did not fail.

jim templin · **Posted:** Thu Apr 15, 2010 11:04 pm

How do you determine if a boiler has a lap seam crack? If it is an internally fired boiler under 42" diameter built after 1890, there will not be one to be found, as the main contributing cause of the lap seam crack (punched rivit holes) was no longer practiced.

I have always felt that one of the big pushes for the butt strap from the inspection community was to relieve them of the responsibility of knowing who and how a boiler was built...research by Bruce Babcock indicates that the ASME knew early on that is wasn't the design of the lap seam, but the construction technique used ie punching, that was the real culprit. There were may comments in the proceedings around this time that basically centered around the idea why do some lap seams develop cracks, while thousands of others were, and are, very safely used.

But how do you determine those factors without uniform stampings and records? Well, you can't, but if you mandate the use of butt strap construction for all new units, (1914 on) from an inspectors point of view, in practice, if a boiler is a butt strap it wasn't constructed by plain punching, hence cracking isn't an issue. Not from the design, but from the method of assembly.

Just so you know, over the Atlantic, they were, and are, in some cases, happily building quite large lap seam boilers for quite high pressures, up to 200psi. It is also noted that the British Inspectorate determined the dangers of plain punching of rivit holes by the 1870's, and in some failure reports I have read, plain punching is cited as the cause of the cracking.

davew833 · **Posted:** Fri Apr 16, 2010 12:12 am

Here's a link to a story about a 1962 boiler explosion in NYC that killed 21.

http://www.washington-heights.us/yabbse ... 1.msg80637

I am posting it because I have a general interest in boiler explosions, both railroad and otherwise. I dont KNOW or CARE whether a lap seam was involved in this explosion, or the one that began this thread.

jim templin · **Posted:** Fri Apr 16, 2010 12:24 am

davew833 wrote:

Here's a link to a story about a 1962 boiler explosion in NYC that killed 21. Not sure if it had lap seams...

http://www.washington-heights.us/yabbse ... 1.msg80637

Excerpted from the archived piece."The City Building Department took the damaged one-ton boiler from the scene for a minute examination by technicians.

“The boiler blew because it was superheated,” THOMPSON said. “It was due probably to failure of the automatic devices which regulate the high and low water level, or failure to maintain a proper water level.”
The seams had NOTHING to do with it.

AlderGulch12 · **Posted:** Fri Apr 16, 2010 1:33 am

Does someone have an agenda against lap seams here? It seems very odd these posts are popping up all of a sudden. What does the explosion of a factory boiler have to do with this board, about railroad preservation?

Stationary Steam · **Posted:** Fri Apr 16, 2010 7:54 am

I don't know as well, and was surprised to read Jim's last post. He didn't have to say that.

I guess railway preservation people don't care about boilers not located above flanged wheels.

jim templin · **Posted:** Fri Apr 16, 2010 9:55 am

Stationary Steam wrote:

I don't know as well, and was surprised to read Jim's last post. He didn't have to say that.

I guess railway preservation people don't care about boilers not located above flanged wheels.

Note that the original, undedited post stated..."I don't know if it had lap seams or not...", which was an inferance that the cause may have been related to lap seam. The thrust of the thread is not about stationary heating boilers, but about the legitimacy of lap seam power boilers. The original poster removed the veiled disparagement of the construction debated herein.

I care about any boiler, but don't want this issue clogged with static. Some here are like the Penelope character on Saturday Night Live, whatever is going on, she wants to be in the middle of it, with some been there, done that nonsense.

mikefrommontana · **Posted:** Fri Apr 16, 2010 10:31 am

I think Jim pretty well hits it on the head as to why there is such a prejudice against the lap seam design. I would think in this day and age of UT and radiographic testing that seam cracking would be fairly obvious to track down, if one chose to look.

Another damning aspect of the Brockton explosion is that the explosion happened right after fire up. Was the boiler laid up dry?wet? How thorough was the inspection? I also found the detail that the end sheets were heavier than the boiler shell an interesting design point.

It would be very good for the boiler community to figure out a way to identify issues that may occur in ALL boilers, rather than sitting smug that exclusion of a one design class will resolve all issues. Besides, more boilers are lost to operator error and poor maintnance than through design failure. I have a suspicion that the welded boilers of today (especially with problems with metallurgy identified elsewhere) will yield more dangerour and insoluble problems in the future than lap seams ever have.

And no, I am not a mechanical engineer of any stripe.

Michael Seitz
Missoula MT

[quote="jim templin"]
I have always felt that one of the big pushes for the butt strap from the inspection community was to relieve them of the responsibility of knowing who and how a boiler was built...research by Bruce Babcock indicates that the ASME knew early on that is wasn't the design of the lap seam, but the construction technique used ie punching, that was the real culprit. There were may comments in the proceedings around this time that basically centered around the idea why do some lap seams develop cracks, while thousands of others were, and are, very safely used.

But how do you determine those factors without uniform stampings and records? Well, you can't, but if you mandate the use of butt strap construction for all new units, (1914 on) from an inspectors point of view, in practice, if a boiler is a butt strap it wasn't constructed by plain punching, hence cracking isn't an issue. Not from the design, but from the method of assembly.
[quote]

PaulWWoodring · **Posted:** Fri Apr 16, 2010 10:54 am

Not to distract too much from the technical aspect of this piece (or be accused of just saying something to say something), but I am moved to say that I have rarely read better journalistic prose than that article from 1905. As someone who cares about good writing, I just want to note the jarring contrast with what passes for journalism today. That's it.