Once again we seem to be back to the question of how do we get the occasional operators enough cab time to get them qualified? How does Ross Rowland train crewman on 614 when it has not ran in 10 years? How do currently qualified volunteers who only have occasion to run a few times a years remain qualified? Can organizations afford to spend precious qualifing time on such volunteers regardless of the amount of shop time or whatever volunteer time they may have? Will the orgainizations be faced with the option of spending the time or chasing off good volunteers? These are difficult questions that we had better be considering.

In something of an answer to mxdata I have long said the railroad, especially the shortline railroads, is the most over regulated industry on the planet. With all the rules and regulations that have come along over the last 15 years or so you would think all of us are riding around hauling nothing but nuclear weapons and our fingers are on the launch buttons. Shortlines like A&R have more in common with a local delivery trucking company than a class 1 railroad. From what I am hearing things may be getting worse in the near future.

I am surely not smart enough to have any of the answers. However, as an industry we had better be working on answers before the government finds them for us. As someone else said we also need to keep in front of the insurance industry. They too have our futures in our hands. We need to be answering these very difficult questions rather than debating the ability of the crew on 745. What happened in that instance will not be fully known until the official reports come out.

John Bohon

John, it is fascinating that you mentioned the transportation of nuclear weapons because training programs for that activity were exactly what came to mind when I read points 7 through 12 ("accountability") in trainlawyer's previous posting. However, I think the kind of an organizational structure used in training programs in the nuclear power generating industry may provide a model for the sort of documentation trail and accountability that might be needed in a steam training program that could pass muster with insurance providers. That is not to say that a steam training program has to take on all the aspects and expense of the training for working in an nuclear plant! I just wanted to point out that having somebody give a class (even if they are a recognized subject "expert"), without a full record of what what was presented and some way to measure how successful it was, doesn't carry much weight at all with an insurance provider.

It seems to me that we already have low water alarms on steam locomotive boilers. They are called water glasses, and now there are two required on each locomotive. In order for these alarms to be effective, they must be observed constantly. Interestingly enough, in order to manage a steam locomotive from a performance standpoint, these devices must be monitored continuously as well.

Let’s suppose we put another low water alarm on the locomotive. This could be mechanical or electronic or whatever. In order for this device to be effective, it must be monitored as well though only when it goes into an alarm condition. It does not have to be observed in the normal course of operating the locomotive. Arguably, this device will never operate if the first two devices are observed properly, unless those two devices (the water glasses) both malfunction and the new device works properly. Given this scenario, it will be necessary that the third device give a very noticeable signal, or that it take remedial action of its own accord.

Given the nature of steam locomotives, having a device “take over” the operation could be somewhat problematic. It could somehow turn on the injectors, which given the way injectors are started as much by feel rather than precise mechanical manipulation, I find this highly unlikely. Turning a pump on would probably work. Cutting off the fuel is not unreasonable unless you happen to burn coal. I won’t insult anyone’s intelligence by following that mechanical nightmare to some conclusion. Any device that will automatically initiate remedial action MUST be redundant and must have very specific inspection and testing requirements. In today’s world it is not economically feasible, or most likely even possible, to “legalize” locomotive safety valves. I cannot even imagine the economics of codifying and implementing an automatic “explosion prevention device”.

Assuming we agree that the “explosion prevention device” is not practical, let’s examine the less draconian method of an alerter of some sort. Does this alarm trump all other water level indicators? What if the water glasses are functioning just fine and show a good water level? We now need a codified protocol to deal with this situation. More training and more stuff to remember – and forget. I think redundancy will be required. It doesn’t make sense to require two water glasses and only one low water alarm of some other design. I think testing and inspection of these new devices must be very specific as well.

Let’s say we adopt the alerter system. We now need something that really gets your attention. Assume the crew is sound asleep on a locomotive working uphill with two or three pops up. I am thinking a three foot diameter backhead-mounted foghorn might do the trick. Once aroused, the crew can go about the business of preventing the explosion, or joining the birds, whichever seems appropriate when coming out of a deep slumber.

Another scenario is one where we find a very alert crew chuffing away with a. no water in the water glasses, b. water glasses with very different readings, c. water glasses showing no movement of the water level, or d. no indication of a level in either glass. The alarm goes off and the alert crew springs into action to prevent a disaster. If the training they received regarding what to do when the low water alarm goes off is consistent with the training they received about reading the water glasses, they might as well join the birds.

The beauty of water glasses and knowing how to use them is that you can see a low water situation developing rather than being notified at or near the time when the situation becomes either critical or unmanageable. Glasses or alarms can only be effective if people know how they work and what to do about it. In my opinion the addition of an alarm only adds another layer of training that is needed which is more stuff to remember – and forget. Additionally, the testing and maintenance required to ensure proper operation, besides being an economic burden, provides that many more opportunities for human error to become a factor.

I have tried to find sufficient justification – actually for many years – for the addition of low water alarms, and when faced with the realities of implementation, I cannot see the benefit. To eliminate low water boiler failures completely without solving the root problem – people - would be as economically viable as preventing terrorists from blowing stuff up. If the training is sufficient to ensure safety within the bounds of human ability, I cannot see a difference in safety between a locomotive with an alarm and one with only water glasses.

To answer Johns question regarding providing a qualified engine crew on 614 when she operates sporadically with long intervals between "gigs". We have been fortunate to have been "adopted" by the fine crew at the New Hope&Ivyland RR and they have both taken care of the engine mechanically and provided the seasoned,proven professionals to crew her when she's on the road. I keep my license current there by working a sufficient number of days/year to keep the rust off. In our case this arrangement has worked well.
I would guess that any outfit that does not run with sufficient frequency to allow its key people to stay current will need a similiar arrangement.
Thanks to Linn Moedinger for his excellent post. I'd like to ask Linn his feelings on making fusible plugs a requirement in the future?
Thanks, Ross Rowland

There is some merit to fusible plugs, however their effectiveness varies depending upon their location, type of locomotive, when they blow, and under what conditions they blow. An arch is a great muffler and a large, hard working locomotive may overwhelm one or more plugs before the "alarm" is noticed.

Small fireboxes should benefit from both the "alerter" aspect and the fire quenching aspect, provided the plug works. Proper care, inspection, and maintenance are required which adds another layer where an "oops" can occur.

Kelly is tracking down an article on the Medina plug which throws another monkey wrench into the works. Stay tuned.

I am not in favor of making the plugs mandatory across the board.

Fusible plugs are, I'm certain, manditory in the UK. They are there to protect the boiler not the crew - after all if a fusible plug works there will be an escape of high pressure steam into the fire - and I wouldn't want to be in the cab if that happens........